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Adversarial Risk in the Generative AI Era Necessitates Dropping the Small Epsilon Ball

Andrew C. Cullen, Neil G. Marchant, Paul Montague, Jiani Xie, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein

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First announced by arXiv: 2026-11-13 · Indexed by Pub-AI: 2026-11-13 UTC

preprint

Adversarial Risk in the Generative AI Era Necessitates Dropping the Small Epsilon Ball

Andrew C. Cullen, Neil G. Marchant, Paul Montague, Jiani Xie, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein

First announced by arXiv: 2026-11-13 · Original record ↗

arxiv
2611.14594
Explicit source versions (1)
  • v1 · Date not supplied
  1. Preprint available

    Source date: 2026-11-13 · First detected: 2026-11-13 UTC · Historical baseline

    Source evidence (1)
    • Official evidence ↗ · RSS guid=oai:arXiv.org:2611.14594v1; arxiv:announce_type=new; item pubDate (official metadata)
Abstract · arxiv

Adversarial Machine Learning research is currently centered on the search for the epsilon-ball: minimal perturbations designed to fool models while remaining imperceptible to humans. We argue that this fixation on $\ell_p$ norms is a metrological trap that communicates a distorted perception of risk to defenders, one that is unaligned with real-world system vulnerabilities. This paradigm misleads defenders into optimizing for narrow, mathematical robustness at the expense of systemic security, while simultaneously incentivizing attackers to exploit non-overlapping alternative adversarial pathways. Ultimately, we argue that the dominance of the $\ell_p$ ball does not just fail to reduce harm---it may actively facilitate it by communicating a false sense of security against the wrong threats.